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Introduction 
 
Economic, financial and social commentators from all directions and persuasion are 
obsessed with the prospect of recovery. The world remains mired in a deep, prolonged 
crisis, and the key question seems to be how to get out of it. The purpose of our paper 
is to ask a very different question that few if any seem concerned with: can capitalists 
afford recovery in the first place? 
This question does not come out of the blue. Over the past several years, we have 
published a series of papers on the crisis (Bichler and Nitzan 2008, 2009; Nitzan and 
Bichler 2009b; Bichler and Nitzan 2010; Kliman, Bichler, and Nitzan 2011). Our basic 
argument in these papers is that this is a systemic crisis and that capitalists have been 
struck by systemic fear: fear for the very survival of the system. 
This fear, we have further argued, is objectively grounded. Our reasons, though, 
are very different from those given by heterodox political economists, particularly 
Marxists. Whereas for the Marxists, the crisis is the symptom and culmination of 
weakening accumulation, for us it is the consequence of its unprecedented strength. 
The two views are anchored in very different cosmologies (Bichler and Nitzan 
2012b). Liberals and Marxists see capital as an economic entity and capitalism as a 
mode of production and consumption, so for them the accumulation crisis is anchored 
in the economics of production and consumption. By contrast, we see capital as a 
symbolic representation of power and capitalism as a mode of power, so for us, the 
crisis of accumulation is a crisis of capitalized power.  
According to our research, the accumulation of capital-read-power might be ap-
proaching its asymptotes, or limits (Bichler and Nitzan 2012a). The closer capitalized 
power is to its asymptotes, the more difficult it is to augment it further. Capitalists, 
though, have no choice. They are conditioned and compelled to increase their capital-
ized power without end, and that relentless drive breeds conflict. It forces capitalists to 
increase their threats, escalate their sabotage and intensify their use of force – and this 
intensification is in turn bound to trigger stronger resistance, contestations, uprisings 
and more.  
                                                          
1 This paper was first presented in Surplus, Solidarity, Sufficiency, The Eighth International 
Rethinking Marxism Conference, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, September 19–22, 
2013. Shimshon Bichler teaches political economy in colleges and universities in Israel 
(tookie@barak.net.il). Jonathan Nitzan teaches political economy at York University in 
Toronto (nitzan@yorku.ca). All their publications are available from The Bichler & Nitzan 
Archives (bnarchives.net). Research for this paper was partly supported by the Social Sciences 
and Research Council of Canada.   
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By the early 2000s, capitalists began to realize the unfolding of this asymptotic 
scenario. They started to sense that their power is nearing its limits and that accumula-
tion is becoming ever more difficult to achieve and might be reversed. And given that 
capitalization is forward-looking, the result has been a major bear market. 
The present paper contextualizes and examines this process from the viewpoint of 
economic policy. The analysis is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the 
mainstream macroeconomic perspective. This approach claims to have already solved 
all the theoretical riddles, so the main emphasis here is on the practical question of how 
to engineer a recovery. The second part deals with the Marxist view. Marxists stress the 
inherent contradictions of accumulation, so the question for them is the very possibility 
of sustained growth. The third and final part takes the view of capital as power. Capi-
talized power hinges not on growth, but on strategic sabotage. So from this viewpoint, 
the key question is not how capitalists can achieve and sustain a recovery, but whether 
they can afford it in the first place. 
  
The Macroeconomic Creed 
 
Begin with systemic fear. The first signs that the ruling class has been struck by such 
fear appeared in the early 2000s. The explicit expression of this fear started to emerge 
after the crash of 2008, and as the quotes in Box 1 suggest, this fear continues un-
abated. In 2008, former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan spoke of himself and his like 
being in a state of ‘shocked disbelief’ after their ‘whole intellectual edifice’ had col-
lapsed, while journalist Gillian Tett of the Financial Times described a sense of total 
confusion, as capitalists, policymakers and smaller investors realized that their ‘intellec-
tual compass’ had been broken. The next five years have done little to ease this sys-
temic fear. In 2013, central bankers admitted quite openly that they have no clue as to 
what is going on – or, in their own words, that they are in ‘uncharted territory’ which 
they do not ‘fully understand’, and that they are ‘flying blind when steering their 
economies’.  
 
Box 1 
Systemic Fear 
 
Alan Greenspan: 
The whole intellectual edifice . . . collapsed in the summer of last year. . . . [T]hose 
of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholder’s 
equity (myself especially) are in a state of shocked disbelief. Such counterparty surveil-
lance is a central pillar of our financial markets’ state of balance. If it fails, as occurred 
this year, market stability is undermined (Andrews 2008; U.S. Congress 2008). 
 
Financial Times Editorial: 
Uncertainty is the only certain thing in this crisis. . . .  a dense fog of confusion has 
. . . descended, obscuring where we are – falling fast, slowly, bumping along the bot-
tom, or finally turning the corner. . . . Economies are behaving unpredictably and will 
continue to do so. The instability is both cause and consequence of the great uncer-
tainty that has been spreading out from the financial markets. Fearful and confused, 
people react erratically to changing news, reinforcing confused market behaviour. It 
doesn’t help that our economic theories were constructed for a different world. Most 
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models depict economies close to equilibrium. . . . And unlike what most models as-
sume, prices are not properly clearing all markets. . . . (Editors 2009). 
 
Gillian Tett: 
[T]he pillars of faith on which this new financial capitalism were built have all but col-
lapsed, and that collapse has left everyone from finance minister or central banker to 
small investor or pension holder bereft of an intellectual compass, dazed and con-
fused (Tett 2009). 
 
Chris Giles: 
[Some] of the leading figures in central banking conceded they were flying blind 
when steering their economies. Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, the former member of the 
European Central Bank’s executive board, captured the mood at the IMF’s spring 
meeting, saying: ‘We don’t fully understand what is happening in advanced econo-
mies’. In this environment of uncertainty about the way economies work and how to 
influence recoveries with policy, Sir Mervyn King, the outgoing governor of the 
Bank of England, said that ‘there is the risk of appearing to promise too much or al-
lowing too much to be expected of us’. . . .  The central bankers were clear that they 
had got it wrong before the crisis, allowing themselves to be lulled, by stable infla-
tion, into thinking they had eliminated financial vulnerabilities. . . .  The question 
now was whether central bankers are making the same mistake in their efforts to se-
cure a recovery. Might they be storing up financial distortions that will bite in the 
future?. . . . ‘Put simply, we are in uncharted territory’, said [vice chairman of the 
Federal Reserve] Mr Viñals. . . . The problem outlined by Sir Mervyn was that the 
uncertainty is so pervasive that no one can be sure that the expansionary monetary 
policy is appropriate in a world where nations are learning they are poorer than they 
expected, but are not sure by how much. How can we be sure ‘we really are [not] 
running the risk of reigniting the problems that led to the financial crisis in the first 
place?’ Mr Bean asked the IMF panel (Giles 2013).  
 
The Great Slide 
 
What underpins this systemic fear? Why does the ruling class feel ‘bereft of intellectual 
compass’? Why do policymakers admit that they are ‘flying blind’?  
Figure 1 provides the broad context. The chart is a snapshot the ‘state of the world 
economy’ since the beginning of the systemic crisis in the early 2000s. The figure 
shows three annual GDP growth rates: (1) the dotted red line is for the advanced coun-
tries, (2) the dashed line is for the developing world, and (3) the solid line is for the 
world as a whole. We can see the first downturn in 2000-2002. The developing world 
and emerging markets recovered briskly from this decline, but the advanced countries 
showed a very feeble recovery. Then came the 2008-9 drop. This downturn was much 
more serious (–5 per cent for the developed world and –3 per cent for the world as a 
whole). And the recovery was limited and brief. By 2010, both regions – and the world 
as whole – began to decelerate rapidly.    
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Figure 1 
Annual GDP Growth 
2000-2012 
www.bnarchives.net
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series show quarterly data, measuring the year-on-year 
growth rates of GDP ‘volumes’. The last data points are 2012:Q4 
for the developing & emerging countries and for the world as a 
whole, and 2013:Q1 for the advanced countries. 
 
SOURCE: IMF International Financial Statistics through Global 
Insight (series codes: L99BP&X@C001 for world GDP growth, 
L99BP&X@C110 for GDP growth of the advanced countries, 
and L99BP&X@C200 for GDP growth of the developing & 
emerging countries). 
 
 
Policymakers looking at this chart must get the shivers.  Despite massive policy in-
tervention – including unorthodox measures that only a few years back would have 
been considered unthinkable – the world economy remains unresponsive. The develop-
ing world shows an uptick; but with the current emerging market turmoil, these data 
seem ripe for a significant downward revision. In the meantime, the advanced coun-
tries are pretty much at a standstill.  
 
The Real/Nominal Dichotomy 
 
To understand the gravity of the situation for policymakers, and for the ruling class 
more broadly, it is useful to provide some theoretical background. Consider the simple 
decomposition offered in Equation 1:  
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1.  deflatorGDPnominalGDPrealGDPnominal 
 
or, 
 
PQY   
 
The equation starts with the total dollar value, or nominal value of GDP (which we 
call Y). This value is the product of two components: the quantity of commodities be-
ing produced, which economists call ‘real’ GDP (denoted as Q in the equation), and 
the average nominal or dollar price of those commodities, which is given by the GDP 
deflator (and marked by P in the equation).  
This decomposition, which goes back to David Hume’s classical dichotomy be-
tween the ‘real’ and the ‘nominal’ spheres of economic life, underlies the national ac-
counts everywhere. We consider this bifurcation to be deeply problematic, both theo-
retically and empirically (Nitzan 1989; Nitzan and Bichler 2009a: Ch. 8). But since 
economists, both mainstream and heterodox, seem to accept the real/nominal duality 
as an article of faith, and given that we are concerned here with their views, not ours, 
we shall use it in this paper without further qualification. 
 
The Keynesian Revolution  
 
Until the 1930s, the conventional liberal dogma was that government intervention was 
unnecessary and harmful: it was unnecessary because the market mechanism was self-
correcting, which, in today’s lingo, means that real GDP tends to oscillate around its 
optimal, full-employment value to begin with; and it was harmful because it led to dis-
tortions, misallocation and undue inflation or deflation. Now, although the pre-1930s 
economists did not think in explicitly macroeconomic terms, we can use Equation 1 to 
translate their argument into contemporary jargon. In a nutshell, their claim was that 
government intervention cannot raise real GDP (Q), which is already at its maximal 
level (although it certainly can lower it). This inability means that any intervention can 
only inflate or deflate nominal GDP (Y) by raising or lowering prices (P). Parentheti-
cally, we should add here that this view was also shared by Marx, who thought that a 
large state would undermine accumulation by taxing away part of the surplus value.  
The crisis of the 1930s shattered this belief. A large chunk of the labour force was 
unemployed, productive capacity was lying idle and the invisible hand did nothing to 
put them back to work. This much was obvious to anyone who could see. But the 
economists could see only through their theory, and that theory asserted that persistent 
unemployment was impossible.  
And that is where Keynes came into the picture. His great achievement was to per-
suade economists (1)  that the real economy can get stuck at less than full employment; 
and (2) that, in terms of Equation 1, the government can remedy the situation because 
it can impact not only the nominal price level (P), but also the real level of output (Q).  
Keynes identified two key problems, both anchored in base instincts. The first 
problem was a mismatch of investment and savings. As society grows richer, he ar-
gued, the propensity to invest declines while the propensity to save rises. And since 
saving and investment decisions are made by different agents, the result of this mis-
match is ‘deficient demand’ and a tendency for stagnation and unemployment.  
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The second problem was that investment decisions are governed by the highly er-
ratic and largely unpredictable ‘animal spirits’ of investors, which make capitalism in-
herently unstable.  
Now, given that capitalism tends to stagnation and instability, and given that the 
government can affect the real economy as well as prices, it made sense for govern-
ments to intervene in order to save capitalists – and capitalism more generally – from 
their own folly.  
 
The Keynesian Record 
 
The historical record seems to confirm this view. Figure 2 shows the U.S. rate of un-
employment and GDP growth since the late 1880s. Unemployment is plotted against 
the right-hand scale and GDP growth against the left-hand scale. The data are divided 
into two sub-periods: until 1946 and from 1946 onward.  
 
Figure 2 
U.S. Unemployment and GDP Growth 
www.bnarchives.net
(right)
(left)11.2
-3.2
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2.4
7.4
4.1
6.1
-0.3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: GDP growth is the annual rate of change of GDP in 
constant prices. Unemployment is expressed as a share of the 
labour force. The last data points are for 2013. 
 
SOURCE: Global Financial Data (series codes: GDPCUSA_Close 
for GDP in constant prices); Historical Statistics of the United States, 
Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition (online) (series code: 
Unemployed_AsPercentageOf_CivilianLaborForce_Ba475_Percent 
for the unemployment rate [till 1947]); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics through Global Insight (series code: RUC for the unemploy-
ment rate, computed as annual averages of monthly data [1948 on-
ward]). 
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To explain what we have done here, consider the rate of unemployment. We have 
taken the period until 1946, and for this period we have computed series mean and 
standard deviation. The top dashed red line is equal to the mean of the series plus one 
standard deviation (which, in this case, adds up to 11.4 per cent), while the bottom 
dashed line is equal to the mean minus one standard deviation (2.4 per cent). Accord-
ing to probability theory, the 9 per cent range between these two lines, equivalent to 
two standard deviations, should contain roughly two thirds of the squared variation of 
the unemployment rate during 1886-1946 and therefore gives us a rough sense of the 
series’ volatility in that period period. The same procedure has been applied to the pe-
riod from 1946 onwards, and, as we can see, the volatility here is almost three times 
smaller: the top dashed line is at 7.4 per cent while the bottom is at 4.1 per cent, yield-
ing a range of only 3.3 per cent. The same calculations are shown for the GDP growth 
series, and here, too, we can see a marked decline in volatility between the two periods. 
This record, which is probably representative of what happened in other countries, 
seems pretty clear. The data serve to explain why, during the early 1970s, both Milton 
Friedman and Richard Nixon proclaimed that ‘we are all Keynesian now’.2 Govern-
ments seem to have learnt how to ‘manage’ their economies. Not only have they pre-
vented a repeat of the Great Depression, they have also significantly reduced the insta-
bility that radical political economists had predicted would shatter capitalism.  
 
The Monetarist Counter-Revolution 
 
But that was also the problem. The success of Keynesian ‘demand management’ meant 
that capitalists were no longer in the driver’s seat. If they misbehaved – either by not 
investing enough or by acting erratically – governments could step in and fix things up. 
Worst still, Keynesian policymaking could be pitted against the capitalists, particularly 
through higher corporate tax rates and progressive personal taxation. This is exactly 
what happened in the United States, with the result being that the national income 
share of corporations stagnated and the distribution of personal income became more 
equal. 
Keynes had to be undone, and this is where Milton Friedman and his monetarist 
counter-revolution came into the picture. Monetarism – and the new-classical macro-
economic theories that developed in its wake – claims that the pre-1930s neoclassicists 
had it right all along. There were only two little things missing from their framework: 
(1) the natural rate of unemployment and (2) expectations.  
The natural rate of unemployment is like the Emperor’s New Clothes: only the mone-
tarists and the new-classicists can see it. For the old, pre-1930s economists, the basic 
rule was ‘what you see is what you get’. If the statistics said that unemployment was 
zero or oscillating close to zero, then the economy must be functioning as well as it 
should. Alternatively, if the statistics said that unemployment was stuck at over 20 per 
cent – as was the case during Great Depression – then the theory, which predicted that 
unemployment should quickly decline, must be wrong.  
Not so for the monetarists and new-classical economists. Appearances can be very 
deceiving, they warn us; particularly if you are a simpleton. But those who can see the 
2 Friedman held onto both ends of the stick. ‘In some sense’, he wrote (1968a: 15), ‘we are all 
Keynesians now; in another, no one is a Keynesian any longer. We all use the Keynesian 
language and apparatus; none of us any longer accepts the initial Keynesian conclusions’. 
Nixon was less subtle, announcing that he was ‘now a Keynesian in economics’ (Anonymous 
1971). 
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emperor’s new clothes know better. They know that, in fact, most unemployment is 
not unemployment at all. It consists of people looking for better jobs, people upgrading 
their skills, or people who are temporarily caught in the friction of blessed technical 
change. This unemployment – whose precise magnitude can change with circum-
stances – is part and parcel of a vibrant, ever-changing capitalism. It is natural and 
therefore desirable; and things that are natural and desirable should not be messed with 
by government.3  
Government policy can reduce unemployment below its natural rate – but only by 
cheating. In terms of Equation 1, the monetarist position is that, if economic agents 
have full information and act rationally, the government can only affect prices. It can-
not affect the real economy. Unfortunately, though, information is not always fully 
available and agents sometimes act irrationally, so there is always the temptation for 
government to try to fool them in order to reduce their unemployment below its natu-
ral rate.  
The ‘efficacy of fooling’ depends on expectations. In Friedman’s naïve version 
(1968b; 1977), expectations adapt only slowly, so unemployment can be reduced below 
its natural rate for a certain period – although there is always a price to pay. Eventu-
ally, agents smarten up; and when they do, Equation 1 ascertains that the entire policy 
boost ends up raising prices. In later versions, such as those of Robert Lucas (1972; 
1973; 1978) and Thomas Sargent (1973), expectations are rational, so expansionary 
policy cannot affect the real economy even in the short run and is immediately trans-
lated into higher inflation. A more recent instalment of this logic, issued by Edward 
Prescott and Finn Kydland (1982), suggests that the entire business cycle is a natural, 
supply-side process and therefore impervious to Keynesian demand policy in the first 
place. 
Friedman, Lucas, Sargent, Kydland and Prescott all won Nobel Memorial Prizes, 
and for a good reason: they managed to undo Keynes. They created a new dogma that 
states not only that macroeconomic policy cannot affect the real economy, but, more 
importantly, that the real economy does not need to be affected in the first place. In 
their laissez faire economy, the rate of unemployment will settle at its natural rate, 
whether it is 6, 8 or 20 per cent. The only thing the government should do is keep pric-
3 The language is definitive. According to Nobel Memorial Prize winner Milton Friedman 
(1968b: 8), ‘At any moment of time there is some level of unemployment which has the 
property that it is consistent with equilibrium in the structure of real wage rates. . . . The 
“natural rate of unemployment”, in other words, is the level that would be ground out by the 
Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, provided there is embedded in them the 
actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets, including market 
imperfections, stochastic variability in demands and supplies, the cost of gathering information 
about job vacancies and labor availability, the costs of mobility, and so on’. For Edmund 
Phelps, another Nobelist of monetarist repute, a certain rate of unemployment is not only 
‘natural’ but also desirable (provided it excludes tenured professors, of course). In his expert 
opinion, most of the so-called unemployed are merely ‘searching’ for a better job. ‘It would be 
as senselessly puritanical to wipe out unemployment as it would be to raise taxes in a deep 
depression’. There is nothing to worry about, he concludes. On the contrary: ‘Today’s 
unemployment is an investment in a better allocation of any given quantity of employed 
persons tomorrow’ (1970: 17). The very same point was reiterated by another monetarist of 
Nobelistic repute, Robert Lucas: ‘When we are unemployed’, he observed, ‘it is because we 
think we can do better’ (interviewed by Snowdon and Vane 2005: 290, emphases added). And 
that must be true. After all, it is well known that whenever Phelps and Lucas invested in their 
own unemployment, they always ended up making a bundle. 
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es stable, by letting the money supply grow at the same rate as the growth of the real 
economy. 
This was the dogma in 2008. 
 
The Crisis 
 
And then came the 2008 stock market crash and the Great Recession. Protected by 
academic tenure and heavy subsidization, the economics profession has remained 
largely unfazed, but the policymakers have panicked, in unison. Within a few years, 
they have lost all confidence in their own dogma. Instead of sitting tight and letting the 
market ‘fix itself’, they have ‘intervened’, massively, breaking almost every rule in their 
book.   
 
Figure 3 
Government Budget Balance in the OECD (% of GDP) 
1970-2012 
www.bnarchives.net
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series show annual data. The government budget balance 
is defined as government net lending. Positive/negative numbers 
indicate surplus/deficit, respectively. The last data points are for 
2012. 
 
SOURCE: OECD StatExtracts (series codes: NLGQ for govern-
ment net lending as a per cent of nominal GDP).  
 
Fiscal Policy 
 
On the fiscal side, policymakers have let budget deficits skyrocket. Figure 3 shows the 
budget balance in the OECD countries, with positive numbers indicating a surplus and 
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negative numbers showing a deficit. We can see that, since the early 1990s, with mone-
tarist neoliberalism in full swing, deficits tended to shrink, and that in some countries 
they reverted to small surpluses. But the first crash of the millennium, in 2000, reversed 
that trend, and in 2008, it was as if all hell had broken loose. The average OECD gov-
ernment deficit rose to nearly 8 per cent of GDP, and in the U.S., the bastion of neolib-
eralism, the deficit reached 12 per cent. 
Of course, this was not exactly a return to Keynesianism, with its emphasis on 
planning through high spending and even higher taxes. Instead, it was a quick-and-
dirty, ‘hands-off intervention’, based mostly on tax cuts. And as we can see, it was 
hastily reversed. By 2010, policymakers started to talk about ‘austerity’ and ‘belt tight-
ening’. And their U-Turn came not because their economies were finally booming or 
because the economists had come up with some new theoretical insight, but because of 
the public debt.  
 
Figure 4 
Government Debt in the OECD (% of GDP) 
1969-2012 
www.bnarchives.net
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series show annual data. Government debt comprises gov-
ernment gross financial liabilities. The last data point is for 2012. 
 
SOURCE: OECD StatExtracts (series code: GGFLQ for general 
government gross financial liabilities as a percentage of GDP).  
 
 
Figure 4 shows the ratio of government debt to GDP in the OECD. With deficits 
soaring and GDP stagnating, governments had to borrow massively, causing the 
debt/GDP ratio to rise by nearly 50 per cent in only 5 years! And with the ratio now 
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hovering around 110 per cent – up from 40 per cent in the 1970s – policymakers now 
warn us they are running out of fiscal ammunition.4 
 
Monetary Policy 
 
The situation with monetary policy looks equally demoralizing. Until 2008, the mone-
tarist mantra spoke about fixed ‘policy rules’ that central bankers should obey. In 2008, 
these rules were thrown out of the window. Instead of letting the money supply grow 
at the same rate as the so-called real economy, central banks embarked on what they 
called ‘quantitative easing’. Or, in simpler words, they began to print money, and in 
large quantities.  
This process is shown in Figure 5. The graph plots the monetary base – which 
measures the amount of notes and coins in circulation – in the United States the Euro-
pean Union and Japan. The numbers are denominated in local currencies and normal-
ized to January 2008=100 so they can be compared easily.  
The watershed is 2008. Before 2008, the expansion of the money supply was rela-
tively orderly, particularly in the European Union and the United States. This pattern 
changed drastically after the crash, with the United States leading the way. Since 2008, 
the U.S. Fed has nearly quadrupled the money supply. The European Central Bank 
quickly followed – though compared to the American ‘bull in a china store’, it threaded 
carefully, choosing fine-tuning over indiscriminate printing. The Japanese, who were 
first to toy with this policy in the early 2000s, are only now re-joining the bandwagon: 
a few months ago they announced plans to double their monetary base in two years.   
This massive money printing is remarkable primarily because it seems to have had 
little or no effect, nominal or real. Begin with the nominal side. From a Keynesian per-
spective, the deep crisis of 2008-9, should have produced deflation, while, from a mon-
etarist viewpoint, the massive quantitative easing should have generated hyperinfla-
tion. Yet neither of these outcomes has materialized. Over the past decade, core infla-
tion in the developed countries – that is, inflation excluding changes in food and energy 
prices – has remained remarkably stable at around 1-2 per cent.  
And the picture is equally embarrassing on the real side. Keynesians had hoped 
that making money cheaper would boost investment and kick-start the economy. 
However, that hasn’t happened. Since the beginning of the crisis, green-field invest-
ment as a share of GDP in the OECD countries has plummeted to its lowest level in 50 
years: this share stood at 25 per cent in the early 1970s; it fell to 21 per cent in 2007 and 
it currently stands on 18 per cent (World Bank Online).  
 
4 A recent scandalized version of this warning was issued by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth 
Rogoff, who claimed that ‘across both advanced countries and emerging markets, high 
debt/GDP levels (90 percent and above) are associated with notably lower growth outcomes’ 
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2010: 577). Coming from top pundits, this warning was happily 
leveraged in support of ‘austerity’ measures, until a group of University of Massachusetts 
economists showed it to be based on faulty Excel sheet calculations. Once corrected, the 
computations showed debt/GDP levels to have had no discernable impact on growth 
(Herndon, Ash, and Pollin 2013). Needless to say, this correction has hardly dented the 
conviction of the debt fixers. 
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Figure 5 
The Monetary Base 
2000-2013 
www.bnarchives.net
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series show monthly data. Original data are in local cur-
rencies, rebased to January 2008=100.0. The last data points are 
May 2013 for the EU and April 2013 for the U.S. and Japan. 
 
SOURCE: IMF International Financial Statistics through Global In-
sight (series codes: L19MA@C111 for the U.S. monetary base; 
Bank of Japan through Global Insight (series code: JPNVM0001 for 
Japan’s monetary base); European Central Bank (series code: 
ILM.M.U2.C.LT01.Z5.EUR for Euro area base money, changing 
composition). 
 
 
Moreover, looking at Figure 6, it is hard to see why Keynesians should have ex-
pected monetary policy to reverse this downtrend. The chart shows long-term govern-
ment bond yields in the three leading OECD countries. These rates were already very 
low when the crisis started, and now, at close to zero, they are lower than at any other 
time since the 1950s. In this case, printing more money is like ‘pushing on a string’, as 
Keynes reputedly put it. It should have no effect on interest rates and therefore none on 
real investment.  
This brief exposition should make it clear why the ruling class feels bereft of an in-
tellectual compass and why its policymakers admit that they are flying blind. Their 
dogma has collapsed. Not only did they abandon this dogma in a panic when the 2008 
crisis struck, but their makeshift solutions have failed to generate meaningful results, let 
alone the expected ones. Moreover, they seem to have run out of ammunition. With 
massive debt, further fiscal expansion becomes impossible; and with interest rates close 
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to zero, monetary expansion is useless. Another crisis today would find them empty 
handed.  
 
Figure 6 
Long-Term Government Bond Yields 
1953-2012 
www.bnarchives.net
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series show annual data. For Japan, data prior to 1966 are 
measured by the prime lending rate. The last data points are for 
2012. 
 
SOURCE: IMF International Financial Statistics through Global In-
sight (L60P@C158 for Japan’s prime lending rate, L61@C158 for 
Japan’s government bond yield, L61@C111 for U.S. government 
bond yield and L61@C134 for Germany’s government bond yield).  
 
 
The Marxist Perspective 
 
For the Marxists, the key question is not how to bring about a recovery, but whether 
sustained growth is possible to begin with. According to Marx, the answer to this 
question is negative. Accumulation for him is rooted in and generated through class 
conflict, and this conflict makes capitalism inherently unstable, prone to crisis and, 
eventually, destined for breakdown. 
Marx himself did not offer a coherent theory of crisis. He did generate, however, 
several key principles that in his view were crucial for understanding the inherent 
crisis tendencies of capitalism. These insights later gave rise to a huge Marxist litera-
ture on crises, to which we cannot do justice here. Our purpose, rather, is simply to 
highlight some of Marx’s insights, as well as the difficulties they give rise to. We fo-
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cus on three theories, which we will examine in turn: (1) the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall; (2) the interaction between the reserve army of the unemployed and the 
real wage; and (3) underconsumption (for critical reviews and overviews of Marxist 
crisis theories, see, for example, Sweezy 1942: Part III; Wright 1977; Shaikh 1978; 
Weisskopf 1978, 1991; Laibman 1999-2000). 
 
The Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall 
 
Profit for Marx is the source of accumulation. As a class, capitalists can only reinvest 
what they appropriate in profit; so if the rate of profit tends to fall, so must the rate at 
which capital accumulates. Now, according to Marx, and here we come to the first 
theory, this downward tendency is built into the very logic of capitalism.  
To see why this is so, let us review the basic Marxist accounting in Equations 2-8 
below. Begin with c, v and s, which are measured in terms of socially necessary ab-
stract labour time. If we denote constant capital by c, variable capital by v and surplus 
value by s, we can express the following three relationships. The organic composition 
of capital θ is the ratio of c/v; the rate of surplus value ξ is the ratio of s/v; and the 
rate of profit π is the ratio of s/(c+v). If we now divide the numerator and denomina-
tor of the rate of profit by v, we can express the rate of profit π as a ratio between the 
rate of surplus value ξ and the organic composition of capital θ plus 1.   
 
2. c = constant capital 
 
 
3. v = variable capital 
 
 
4. s = surplus value 
 
5. 
v
c = organic composition of capital 
 
6. 
v
s = rate of surplus value 
 
7. 
vc
s
 = rate of profit 
 
8. 
111  capitalofncompositioorganic
valuesurplusofrate
vc
vs
vc
s

  
 
This framework, says Marx, enables us to understand one of the key built-in lim-
itations of capitalism. Competition compels profit-maximizing capitalists to con-
stantly mechanize their production, and this relentless process causes the organic 
composition to rise over time. Capitalists are also driven to raise the rate of surplus 
value (although it is not entirely clear why, under competitive conditions, they 
should succeed in doing so). In Marx’s opinion – which he himself was never com-
pletely convinced of – the organic composition tends to rise, and it tends to rise faster 
than the rate of surplus value, assuming that this rate trends upward as well (on 
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Marx's life-long attempt to grapple with this process, see Heinrich 2013). The pro-
gressive growth of the organic composition is offset by counter-tendencies; but ac-
cording to Marx, over the longer-haul the former process is stronger, causing rate of 
profit to trend downward. Over time, therefore, accumulation tends to decelerate, 
crises multiply and capitalism becomes ever more difficult to sustain.  
The problems with these propositions are legion, and here we highlight three (for 
a more detailed account, see Nitzan and Bichler 2009a, Chs. 6-8). The first problem 
is with the unit of measurement. Labour values, which Marx’s variables are denomi-
nated in, cannot be observed or examined directly, making their empirical inquiry 
difficult if not impossible. The second problem is that mechanization per se can tell 
us nothing about labour values. Even if we accept Marx’s value scheme, it is entirely 
possible for technical change to devalue constant capital faster than the rate at which 
capitalists augment their ‘physical machinery’ (however measured). If that happens, 
the organic composition will fall rather than rise. Third and finally, for Marx, the 
economy is bifurcated into productive and unproductive activity. The former pro-
duces surplus value, while the latter uses it – yet there is no objective basis to decid-
ing which economic activity is productive and which is not.  
The consequences of this last problem are illustrated in Figures 7 and 8, which 
pertain to the United States. Since labour values cannot be observed, in both charts 
we assume – as most Marxists do in their empirical analysis – that these values are 
more or less equal to market prices. Of course, if this assumption is incorrect, the 
estimates we present here are meaningless.  
Figure 7 takes a naïve perspective. It is naïve because in this chart we assume, 
contrary to most Marxists, that all sectors are productive of surplus value. The dotted 
line approximates the organic composition of capital. It is estimated by taking the 
ratio between the current (replacement) dollar cost of all non-residential fixed assets 
and the dollar value of employee compensation. The solid line measures the Marxist 
rate of profit, computed as the ratio of net operating surplus (which is net domestic 
product less employee compensation) and the sum of the current dollar cost of fixed 
assets and employee compensation.5 
Now, on the face of it, the current crisis seems consistent with the theory. We 
can see that, since the early 2000s, the organic composition has risen and the rate of 
profit has dropped. Moreover, this inverse relationship seems to hold – at least cycli-
cally – for the entire period since the 1930s.  
Technically, this inverse relationship is not entirely surprising. Since fixed assets 
appear in the numerator of one ratio and the denominator of the other, their varia-
tions will cause the two ratios to move inversely, by definition. 
The difficulty with this figure lies in the longer-term trends. The rate of profit in 
the chart seems to trend downward, in line with Marx’s theory. But this decline is 
supposed to be caused by a rising organic composition of capital, whereas in the 
chart this composition seems to have fallen over time. In other words, the decline in 
the rate of profit – assuming we accept its definition here – must have been caused by 
factors other than the organic composition of capital.  
                                                          
5 We should note here that Marxists remain divided on whether ‘capital’ in the rate of profit 
should include both the physical capital stock and the wage bill, so π = s / (c + v), or only the 
physical capital stock, so π = s / c. Here we remain true to Marx’s original formulation (the 
former), although using the latter would yield the same conclusions. For the United States, the 
two rate-of-profit formulas result in different magnitudes, but these magnitudes correlate 
tightly in their long-term trends and short-term fluctuations. 
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Figure 7 
Naïve Marxist Proxies for the U.S. Rate of Profit  
and the Organic Composition of Capital 
1929-2011 
www.bnarchives.net
Net Operating Surplus /
(Fixed Assets + Labour Income)
(left)
Fixed Assets / Labour Income
(right)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Fixed Assets is the replacement cost of private and gov-
ernmental net non-residential fixed assets. Labour income is domes-
tic compensation of employees. Net operating surplus is net domes-
tic product less labour income. The last data points are for 2011. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global In-
sight (series codes: FAPAGNRE for net fixed assets; NDP for net 
domestic product; YDCOMP for domestic compensation of em-
ployees).  
 
 
Now, adherents of the falling tendency theory would likely contest our naïveté 
here. In order to properly compute the organic composition and the rate of profit, 
they would argue, we must first differentiate between productive activity that pro-
duces surplus value and unproductive activity that uses surplus value. This, though, 
is easier said than done. And since nobody knows exactly which labour activity is 
productive and which is not, Marxists take a shortcut. They identify entire sectors 
that they deem to be productive and separate them from all other sectors, which they 
classify as unproductive (see, for example, Shaikh and Tonak 1994; Carchedi 2011).  
Figure 8 follows this standard Marxist practice. It identifies four sectors as the 
productive core of the U.S. economy: agriculture, mining, construction and manu-
facturing. The remaining sectors are considered unproductive. With this bifurcation, 
the organic composition of capital is calculated not for the economy as a whole, but 
only for the four sectors that produce surplus value. Part of this surplus value is ap-
propriated by capitalists in these productive sectors; the rest is appropriated by the 
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capitalists and workers of the unproductive sectors. To calculate the overall surplus 
value we subtract from net domestic income the wage bill of the productive sectors. 
We then divide this surplus value by the sum of the fixed assets and wages of the 
productive sectors, to get the rate of profit.   
 
Figure 8 
Refined Marxist Proxies for the U.S. Rate of Profit  
and the Organic Composition of Capital 
1947-2011 
www.bnarchives.net
Surplus Value /
(Productive Assets + Productive Wages)
(right)
Productive Assets / Productive Wages
(left)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Productive assets are estimated by the replacement cost of 
net fixed assets in agriculture, construction, mining and manufac-
turing. Productive wages are estimated by compensation of em-
ployees in agriculture, construction, mining and manufacturing. 
Surplus value is estimated by net domestic product less productive 
wages. The last data points are for 2011. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global In-
sight (series codes: FAPNRM11, FAPNRM21, FAPCON and 
FAPM, for net fixed assets in agriculture, mining, construction and 
manufacturing, respectively; COMPDPNRM11, COMP-
DPNRM21, COMPDPCON and COMPDPM for compensation 
of employees in agriculture, mining, construction and manufactur-
ing, respectively; NDP for net domestic product). 
 
 
Now, unlike in Figure 7, in this chart the organic composition trends upward, as 
it should – but, then, so does the rate of profit! In Marxist terms, this relationship 
means that there are counter-tendencies that more than offset the long-term impact of 
the rising organic composition. Proponents of this theory may again contest that our 
particular choice of productive and unproductive sectors is inappropriate, and maybe 
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they are right. Unfortunately, though, there is no way to objectively delineate the two 
sectors, and this inability creates the temptation to choose the particular bifurcation 
whose results happen to be consistent with the theory. Finally, we should reiterate 
(1) that we are using neoclassical price data rather than Marxist labour values, so 
what we see in these charts might have nothing do with Marx’s theory to begin with; 
and (2) that, since labour values remain unknown, there is no way to know whether 
our findings support or undermine Marx’s theory. 
 
The Reserve Army of the Unemployed and the Real Wage 
 
Another driver of crisis in Marx is the relationship between the reserve army of un-
employed and the real wage. For Marx, unemployment is the regulatory mechanism 
that ascertains that wages gravitate toward their subsistence level. During a boom, 
the bargaining power of workers strengthens, so the real wage tends to rise above its 
labour value. This rise squeezes profit, causing capitalists to invest less. A crisis then 
ensues, unemployment rises, and the real wage is compressed back to subsistence. 
Figure 9 examines this process with respect to the United States. The chart shows 
two series. The rate of unemployment, represented by the dashed line, is plotted 
against the right logarithmic scale. The rate of change of the real wage is shown by 
the solid line and is plotted against the left inverted scale. The inversion means that a 
downward movement of this series in the chart represents a rise in the rate of growth 
of the real wage. Note that both series are smoothed as 5-year moving averages. 
This relationship, which does not depend on knowing labour values, seems con-
sistent with Marx’s claims and looks highly robust. Whenever unemployment rises, 
the rate of change of the real wage falls – and vice versa when unemployment falls. 
Both series show a significant change in the run-up to the current crisis: unemploy-
ment fell since the early 1980s, and particularly during the 1990s, while the rate of 
change of the real wage accelerated in tandem with this fall. In light of these devel-
opments, the crisis of the 2000s could be interpreted, at least in part, as a classical 
Marxist backlash set in motion to rid capitalists of excessive wages squeezing their 
profit. And indeed, since the onset of the crisis, the rate of unemployment has soared 
and the rate of growth of the real wage has been reduced to a standstill. Whether this 
process is the principal driver of the crisis of course is hard to tell, but it is certainly 
consistent with it.  
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Figure 9 
U.S. Unemployment and ‘Real’ Wage Growth 
1930-2013 
www.bnarchives.net
(share of labour force, right)
(annaul rate of change, left)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series are shown as 5-year moving averages. The ‘real’ 
wage rate is the nominal hourly wage rate divided by the implicit 
GDP deflator. The rate of change of the ‘real’ wage concatenates 
the rates of change for production workers in manufacturing until 
1952 and for workers in the nonfarm business sector afterwards. 
The last data points are for 2013. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global In-
sight (series codes: PDIGDP for the implicit GDP deflator); Histori-
cal Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial 
Edition (online) (series code:  AllManufactur-
ing_Hourly_Ba4361_Dollars for hourly wages of production work-
ers in manufacturing [till 1938]); U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
through Global Insight (series codes: AHPMFNS for hourly wages 
of production workers in manufacturing, computed as annual aver-
ages of monthly data [from 1939 onward]; JRWSSNFE for hourly 
compensation of employees in the nonfarm business sector, com-
puted as annual averages of quarterly data [from 1947 onward]); 
Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Mil-
lennial Edition (online) (series code: Unem-
ployed_AsPercentageOf_CivilianLaborForce_Ba475_Percent for 
the unemployment rate [till 1947]); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
through Global Insight (series code: RUC for the unemployment 
rate, computed as annual averages of monthly data [1948 onward]). 
 
 
The picture, however, is rather different when we move from the rate of change 
of the real wage to its absolute level. This is what we do in Figure 10. The chart 
shows the rate of unemployment against the right log scale and the real wage against 
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the left log scale. We use two real-wage series – for production workers in manufac-
turing only and for all workers in the nonfarm business sector. Both series are ex-
pressed as indices.  
 
 
Figure 10 
U.S. Unemployment and the ‘Real’ Wage Rate 
1920-2013 
www.bnarchives.net
(share of labour force, right)
(manufacturing, left)
(nonfarm business, left)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The ‘real’ hourly wage is the nominal hourly wage rate di-
vided by the implicit GDP deflator and expressed as an index. The 
last data points are for 2013. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global In-
sight (series codes: PDIGDP for the implicit GDP deflator); Histori-
cal Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial 
Edition (online) (series code:  AllManufactur-
ing_Hourly_Ba4361_Dollars for hourly wages of production workers 
in manufacturing [till 1938]); U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
through Global Insight (series codes: AHPMFNS for hourly wages 
of production workers in manufacturing, computed as annual aver-
ages of monthly data [from 1939 onward]; JRWSSNFE for hourly 
compensation of employees in the nonfarm business sector, com-
puted as annual averages of quarterly data [from 1947 onward]); His-
torical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millen-
nial Edition (online) (series code: Unem-
ployed_AsPercentageOf_CivilianLaborForce_Ba475_Percent for the 
unemployment rate [till 1947]); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
through Global Insight (series code: RUC for the unemployment 
rate, computed as annual averages of monthly data [1948 onward]). 
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Unlike Figure 9, this chart seems to present an anomaly. We can see that, as one 
may expect, the level of real wages moved inversely with unemployment till the early 
1940s – yet, from then onward, the relationship inverted. Unemployment started to 
rise and continued to do so till the early 1980s; but the real wage, instead of falling or 
at least stagnating, rose in tandem. Moreover, when unemployment stopped rising 
and even fell during the 1990s, the real wage, instead of rising, stagnated. From this 
viewpoint, the reserve army of the unemployed no longer seems to play the role that 
Marx allotted to it in the nineteenth century, at least not in any evident way. Com-
pared to the earlier postwar era, the real wage during the 1990s and 2000s has hardly 
changed, so it is difficult to see it as a ‘profit squeezing’ factor underlying the current 
crisis. 
 
Underconsumption 
 
The third Marxist driver of crisis is underconsumption. Unlike the theory of the fal-
ling tendency of the rate of profit, which emphasizes the limits on the production of 
surplus value, underconsumption deals with the limits on the realization of surplus 
value. The starting point is the more or less universal fact that workers, because of 
their lower income, spend most if not all of that income on consumption. By con-
trast, capitalists, whose income is much higher, can afford – and are compelled by 
their social role as capitalists – to save most of it. So, all else remaining the same, a 
redistribution of income from workers to capitalists will tend to reduce the average 
share of consumption in aggregate spending. The consequence of this reduction, say 
the underconsumptionists, is a glut of unsold commodities, lower prices and lower 
profit. And since falling profit tends to lower investment spending, we end up with a 
generalized ‘realization crisis’. 
Until the early twentieth century, this view was not particularly popular among 
Marxists, partly because Marx himself seemed rather ambivalent about it.  But the 
rise of imperialism in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Great Depression 
of the 1930s, and the militarized boom of the Second World War changed this atti-
tude. Following John Hobson’s pioneering work on Imperialism (1902), Marxists 
started to seriously contemplate the significance of underconsumption for capitalist 
crisis (Hilferding 1910; Luxemburg 1913; Kautsky 1914; Lenin 1917). And with 
Keynes’ emphasis on deficient demand, Marxist underconsumption theories enjoyed 
a significant revival (for a critical analysis, see Bichler and Nitzan 2012c).  
The most innovative contributor to this literature was the Polish political econ-
omist Michal Kalecki (for a posthumous edited collection, see Kalecki 1971). Writ-
ing in the early 1930s, Kalecki developed a class-based micro-macro model that an-
ticipated and, in some important sense, went beyond Keynes. One of the key novel-
ties of Kalecki’s model was the role played by the market structure and the conse-
quences of that structure for the distribution of income and the level of aggregate 
demand (Kalecki 1933, 1939, 1943; Asimakopulos 1975, 1987). According to Kal-
ecki, modern corporate structures tend to be highly concentrated. The extent of this 
concentration, he said, can be measured by the ‘degree of monopoly’, which he de-
fined as (approximately) equal to the ratio of unit profit to unit price, or the share of 
capital in national income. All else being the same, he said, the higher the degree of 
monopoly – and therefore the higher the income share of capital – the lower the av-
erage share of consumption in aggregate spending, and hence the greater the ten-
dency toward deficient demand and stagnation.  
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Later on, this insight became a key theoretical basis for the Monopoly Capital 
School. According to this school – led by Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy and others 
associated with the journal Monthly Review – oligopolistic capitalism tends to gener-
ate stagflation and needs wasteful spending – particularly military expenditures and 
financialization – to offset this tendency (Steindl 1952; Tsuru 1956; Baran and 
Sweezy 1966; Magdoff and Sweezy 1983; Foster and Szlajfer 1984).  
Kalecki’s argument can be generalized beyond its original emphasis on capital 
versus labour. If the share of consumption in personal income is associated with the 
level of personal income, then we should expect personal or household income ine-
quality, regardless of its source, to be inversely correlated with the pace of economic 
activity.  
Figure 11 examines this proposition for the United States. The dotted line at the 
bottom shows the income share of the top 1 per cent of the U.S. population (for a 
comparative critical assessment of income-distribution data, see  Burkhauser et al. 
2012). The solid series at the top of the chart depicts the pace of economic activity, 
approximated here by the rate of growth of employment. Note that we use employ-
ment growth rather than overall economic growth. The reason is that overall growth 
is affected by both employment and productivity growth, but only the former re-
sponds directly to underconsumption. Both series are smoothed as 10-year moving 
averages. 
The relationship shown in the figure is rather remarkable. We can discern three 
distinct periods, indicated by the dashed, freely drawn line going through the em-
ployment series. The first period, from the turn of the century till the 1930s, is the so-
called Gilded Age. Income inequality is rising and employment growth is plummet-
ing.  
The second period, from the Great Depression till the early 1980s, is marked by 
the Keynesian welfare-warfare state. Higher taxation and spending make distribution 
more equal, while employment growth accelerates. Note the massive acceleration of 
employment growth during the Second World War and its subsequent deceleration 
bought by postwar demobilization. Obviously these dramatic movements are unre-
lated to income inequality, but they do not alter the series’ overall upward trend.  
The third period, from the early 1980s to the present, is marked by neoliberalism. 
In this period, monetarism assumes the commanding heights, inequality starts to 
soar, and employment growth plummets. The current rate of employment growth 
hovers around zero while the top 1 per cent appropriates 20 per cent of all income – 
similar to the numbers recorded during Great Depression.  
Figure 11 certainly seems consistent with the Monopoly Capital version of un-
derconsumption. It suggests that the current crisis is the culmination of a systemic 
increase in inequality that began in the early 1980s, which in turn bred undercon-
sumption tendencies and lowered employment growth to a standstill (for a survey of 
debates and evidence on the role of income inequality in the recent crisis, see van 
Treeck and Sturn 2012; on wage-led growth, see Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013).  
For the underconsumptionists, getting out of this crisis now depends on what 
happens to inequality. If the distribution of income can be made more equal – as it 
was after the Great Depression – a new phase of growth may ensue. But if increasing 
inequality is inherent to the present logic of capital – for example, because of the 
drive toward greater exploitation or the imperative of higher concentration and cen-
tralization – then the crisis may be difficult if not impossible to resolve.  
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Figure 11 
U.S. Income Distribution and Employment Growth 
1900-2013 
www.bnarchives.net
(annual rate of change, left)
(level, right)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series show annual data smoothed as 10-year moving 
averages. The trend dashed lines going through the employment 
growth series are drawn freehand. The income share of the top 1% 
is inclusive of capital gains. The last data points are 2011 for the 
income share of the top 1% and 2013 for employment growth.  
 
SOURCE: Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the 
Present: Millennial Edition (online) (series code: 
CivilianLaborForce_Employed_Total_Ba471_Thousand for 
employment [till 1947]); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics through 
Global Insight (series code: ENS for employment, computed as 
annual averages of monthly data [1948 onward]); The World Top 
Incomes Database at http://topincomes.g-
mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/ for the income share of the top 
1%. 
 
 
The Common Economic Underpinnings of Marxism and Liberalism  
 
And here we come to a crucial question: what exactly do we mean by crisis? So far, 
we have treated this concept as if it were self-evident – but is it?  
For Marxists as well as mainstream liberal economists, the engine of capitalism 
is the economy, and specifically the accumulation of capital and the growth of GDP. 
Accumulation and growth are seen as two sides of the same process. Accumulation 
generates growth, and growth sustains accumulation. Both are thought of as ‘eco-
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nomic’ processes, denominated in real terms of production and consumption. From 
this viewpoint, crisis is a breakdown of both accumulation and growth.  
 
Figure 12 
‘Real’ Accumulation and Economic Growth 
1925-2012 
5-year moving average
(left)
(right)
www.bnarchives.net
1950=100
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Fixed assets are chain-type quantity indices of the net 
stock of private and government residential and non-residential 
assets (excluding consumer durables). GDP is a chain-type 
quantity index. The last data points are 2011 for fixed assets and 
2012 for GDP.  
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global 
Insight (series codes: JQFA for fixed assets and JQGDPR for 
GDP).  
 
And that is what we see in Figure 12. The bottom panel of the figures shows the 
level of the U.S. real capital stock and GDP since 1929, while the top panel shows 
their respective rates of growth smoothed as 5-year moving averages. Both the levels 
and rates of change of the two magnitudes move in tandem. And if we take the top 
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panel at face value, our conclusion would be that the current crisis comes at the tail 
end of a prolonged deceleration that began in the 1960s and has recently culminated 
in a near breakdown.  
 
Figure 13 
‘Real’ GDP, Capitalist Income and Labour Income 
1929-2012 
5-year moving averages
www.bnarchives.net
1950=100
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: ‘Real’ GDP is a chain-type quantity index. Pretax profit 
and interest and compensation of employees exclude income from 
the rest of the world. ‘Real’ measures are derived by dividing the 
nominal series by the implicit price deflator. The last data points 
are for 2012. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global 
Insight (series codes: JQGDPR for GDP; ZBECOND for 
domestic pretax profit; INTNETDBUS for domestic interest 
payments; YDCOMP for domestic compensation of employees; 
PDIGDP for the implicit GDP deflator).  
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Considered in conjunction with evidence shown earlier in the paper, this process 
seems consistent with the Marxist claim that accumulation rests on class conflict, 
and that this conflict makes capitalism prone to crisis. But if we examine Figure 13, 
we can also see that, in terms of their so-called real incomes, the fate of both capital-
ists and workers goes hand in hand with the economy. The chart shows the levels 
and rates of growth of real wages and real capitalist income, and both trace the level 
of real GDP and oscillate in tandem with its rate of growth. 
In this very basic sense, then, Marxists and liberal economists sit on the same 
side of the fence. In both perspectives, the material interests of capitalists and work-
ers depend on economic growth and capital accumulation, and if this twin engine 
fails, as it does during a crisis, both classes lose.  
The difference between the two approaches lies in the reasons they give for the 
crisis and whether or not it can be averted. Mainstream economists root crises in im-
perfections, distortions and misguided intervention that can be solved or counter-
acted by adequate policy (primarily deregulatory), whereas Marxists claim that crises 
are built into the conflictual class logic of capitalism and therefore are difficult to fix 
and impossible to eliminate. But both agree on the fundamental question of what 
constitutes a crisis in the first place.  
 
Capital as Power 
  
The theory of capital as power differs radically from both Marxism and mainstream 
economics (Nitzan and Bichler 2009a; Bichler and Nitzan 2012b). Capital, it argues, 
is not an economic entity, but an institution of power. So a crisis of accumulation is 
not a crisis of production or consumption, but a crisis of capitalist power (Bichler and 
Nitzan 2010; Kliman, Bichler, and Nitzan 2011; Bichler and Nitzan 2012a).  
Now, what do we mean by capitalist power? Following the scientific notion of 
power, first articulated by Johannes Kepler in 1600, we see capitalist power not as a 
qualitative stand-alone entity, but as a quantified relationship between entities. In 
capitalism, this quantitative relationship is manifested through the distributional grid 
of incomes and assets between capitalist and no-capitalist classes, as well as among 
the capitalists themselves.  
Based on this notion, we suggested in the late 1990s two tentative conditions for 
what constitutes a sustained regime of accumulation (Nitzan 1998). The first and key 
condition is non-negative differential accumulation; in other words, that the capitali-
zation of dominant capital rises or at least remains stable relative to the capitalization 
of the average firm. This condition reflects both the power drive of accumulation as 
well as the necessity to exercise power in order to bring society under effective busi-
ness control.  
The second condition is a steady or rising capital share of income. This condi-
tion is partly an indirect result of the first condition; however, it also reflects the 
overall balance of power between capitalists and other societal groups. Unless this 
condition is fulfilled, the ‘capitalist’ nature of the system could be put into question. 
Within this context, a significant violation of one or both criteria brings the 
threat of a major capitalist crisis. 
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The Evolution of Capitalist Power in the United States 
 
Figure 14 examines the historical evolution of these two criteria in the United States. 
The chart, which revises and updates research that we first presented in the late 
1990s, shows two comprehensive measures of capitalist income. Capitalist income is 
defined here as pretax profit and net interest – or what the accountants call EBIT, an 
acronym for ‘earnings before interest and taxes’.  
Begin with the top dotted series. This series, plotted against the left arithmetic 
scale, shows the share of pretax profit and net interest in overall national income. 
The unmistakable trend of the series is up. Since 1929, the relative power of capital-
ists, measured here by their income share, has risen by one third – from roughly 12 
per cent to about 16 per cent. Furthermore, the volatility of this share, indicated by 
the gradual convergence of the top and bottom dashed lines, has been reduced sig-
nificantly. And if we take volatility as a proxy for risk, we would conclude that the 
risk facing capitalists has declined as well.   
The bottom series, plotted against the right log scale, shows the differential capi-
talist income of the largest 200 U.S.-incorporated firms (we use income rather than 
capitalization here, since the latter measure is unavailable for most firms). This dif-
ferential shows the EBIT of an average corporation in the top 200 group relative to 
the EBIT of an average U.S. corporation and is calculated in three steps: (1) by com-
puting the average EBIT of the largest 200 firms; (2) by computing the sum of pretax 
profit and net interest for the average U.S. corporation; and (3) by dividing the for-
mer by the latter.  
Here too the pattern is remarkable. Since we are using a log scale, the slope of 
the line is indicative of its rate of change. Overall, differential capitalist income by 
this measure rose from about 900 in the early 1950s to rough 14,000 by the mid 
2000s, representing an average annual differential accumulation of 4.5 per cent.  
Note that as we move from viewing capital as an economic entity to seeing it as 
relationship of power, the picture inverts. Whereas economic growth, the accumula-
tion of fixed assets and the growth of real labour and capital income have all deceler-
ated since the 1960s, the differential power of capitalists in general and of dominant 
capital in particular has trended upward.  
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Figure 14 
Capitalist Income Share and Differential Capitalist Income 
www.bnarchives.net
Pretax Profit and Net Interest
as a Share of National Income
(left)
Ratio of Pretax Profit and Net Interest per Firm
Top 200 Corporations / All Corporations
(right)
1929-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Aggregate profit is pretax and includes capital consumption 
adjustment (CCAdj) and inventory valuation adjustment (IVA). Capi-
talist income for the top 200 firms, ranked by market value, is esti-
mated by EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes). The top 200 firms 
are selected from U.S.-incorporated firms in Compustat’s North 
American dataset (excluding firms with no assets and/or no EBIT 
and duplicates). Differential capitalist income is the average EBIT for 
a top-200 corporation divided by the average pretax profit and net in-
terest per corporation. The last data points are for 2012. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global Insight 
(series codes: ZBECON for domestic pre-tax profit with CCAdj & 
IVA; INTNETAMISC for net interest; YN for national income); The 
number of active corporations is from Historical Statistics of the United 
States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition (online) (series 
codes: Ch13, till 1997); U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States 2012 (Table 744, p. 491, for 1998-2008) and 
the IRS (for 2009-2010). The numbers for 2011-12 are extrapolated 
using the average growth rate for 2001-2010 (1.4%). Compustat ‘fun-
da’ file through WRDS (series codes for Compustat companies: EBIT 
for earnings before income and taxes; CSHO for number of out-
standing shares; PRCC_C for closing share price). 
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The Two Crises of Capital as Power 
 
The increase in differential capitalist income since the 1950s has been relatively 
smooth – with two exceptions: two brief periods in which dominant capital experi-
enced differential decumulation. (1) In the late 1970s, differential accumulation start-
ed to decelerate, and by the early 1980s, it suffered a deep, 20 per cent drop. How-
ever, with Ronald Reagan in the White House, monetarism back in the driver’s seat 
and neoliberalism in full swing, the increase quickly resumed and lasted for another 
twenty years. (2) During the early 2000s, the process again started to slow down, and 
in 2007 there was a marked decline: in the following two years, the top 200 firms saw 
their differential income drop by over 30 per cent.  
The 2000s episode is different from the one in the 1980s in two respects. First, in 
the 1980s, while dominant capital was suffering differential decumulation, the share 
of capital in national income was actually rising. By contrast, in the 2000s, both dif-
ferential accumulation and the capitalist share of income were falling. Second, and 
perhaps more ominously for capitalists, nowadays both measures of power are prob-
ably more difficult to increase than they were during the 1980s.  
With respect to differential accumulation, this greater difficulty is evident from 
the mere fact that the differential EBIT of the top 200 corporations is now nearly 
three times higher than it was in the 1980s. Pushing this magnitude even further will 
require an avalanche of mergers and acquisitions and/or intense measures to in-
crease differential markups more and more – an already tall order that will grow even 
taller with every further increase in the differential size of dominant capital (on strat-
egies and regimes of differential accumulation, see Nitzan 2001; Nitzan and Bichler 
2009a: Chs. 15-17). 
 
Capital as Power and Strategic Sabotage 
 
To understand the limits on the overall share of capital in national income, we turn 
now to the two last charts of the paper – Figures 15 and 16. The relationship pre-
sented in these figures might seem counter-intuitive – but only if you take your cue 
from the ‘economic’ understanding of capitalism. If you look at these relationships 
from the viewpoint of capital as power, the puzzle quickly disappears.  
Figure 15 shows the overall share of capital in domestic income along with the 
rate of unemployment. The top panel displays the levels of the two variables, both 
smoothed as 5-year moving averages. The solid line, plotted against the left log scale, 
shows pretax profit and net interest as a percent of domestic income. The dotted line, 
plotted against the right log scale, shows the rate of unemployment three years ear-
lier. The bottom panel shows the annual rates of change of the two top variables 
since 1940. 
The same relationship is displayed, somewhat differently, in Figure 16. This 
chart shows the two variables from Figure 15 for the 1947-2012 period – but instead 
of plotting them against time, it plots them against each other. The capitalist share of 
domestic income is plotted against the vertical axis, while the rate of unemployment 
three years earlier is plotted against the horizontal axis.  
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Figure 15 
U.S. Unemployment and the  
Domestic Income Share of Capital  
Three Years Earlier
(right)
Share of Domestic Income
(left)
www.bnarchives.net
1920-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series show annual data smoothed as 5-year moving aver-
ages. Profit is pre-tax and includes capital consumption adjustment 
(CCAdj) and inventory valuation adjustment (IVA). Unemploy-
ment is expressed as a share of the labour force. The last data points 
are 2012 for profit and interest and 2013 for unemployment. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global In-
sight (series codes: GDY for domestic income; ZBECOND for do-
mestic pre-tax profit with CCAdj & IVA; INTNETDBUS for domes-
tic net interest); Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to 
the Present: Millennial Edition (online) (series code: Unem-
ployed_AsPercentageOf_CivilianLaborForce_Ba475_Percent for the 
unemployment rate [till 1947]); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
through Global Insight (series code: RUC for the unemployment rate, 
computed as annual averages of monthly data [1948 onward]). 
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Figure 16 
U.S. Unemployment and the  
Domestic Income Share of Capital  
www.bnarchives.net
1947-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series show annual data smoothed as 5-year moving av-
erages. Profit is pre-tax and includes capital consumption adjust-
ment (CCAdj) and inventory valuation adjustment (IVA). Unem-
ployment is expressed as a share of the labour force. The last data 
points are 2012 for profit and interest and 2013 for unemploy-
ment. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global In-
sight (series codes: GDY for domestic income; ZBECOND for do-
mestic pre-tax profit with CCAdj & IVA; INTNETDBUS for do-
mestic net interest); Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest 
Times to the Present: Millennial Edition (online) (series code: Unem-
ployed_AsPercentageOf_CivilianLaborForce_Ba475_Percent for 
the unemployment rate [till 1947]); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
through Global Insight (series code: RUC for the unemployment 
rate, computed as annual averages of monthly data [1948 onward]). 
 
 
The direction and tightness of this relationship leaves little to the imagination. If 
we regress the capitalist share of domestic income against the rate of unemployment 
three years earlier, we find that for every 1 per cent increase in unemployment, there 
is 0.8 per cent increase in the capitalist share of domestic income three years later 
(see the straight OLS regression line going through the observations). The R-squared 
of the regression indicates that, between 1947 and 2012 changes in the unemploy-
ment rate accounted for 82 per cent of the squared variations of capitalist income 
three years later.  
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Can Capitalists Afford Recovery? 
 
What do Figures 15 and 16 tell us? From the viewpoint of both mainstream econom-
ics and Marxism, the relationships in these figures are highly counterintuitive. Be-
cause accumulation and growth are seen as two sides of the same process, unem-
ployment is generally viewed as a curse for both capitalists and workers. As noted, 
Marx was prescient in identifying the role of unemployment in disciplining workers 
and reducing their wages back to their labour values. But this process is supposed to 
serve accumulation only for brief periods, particularly toward the peak of the busi-
ness cycle. Over the longer haul, though, capitalists, just like workers, are interested 
in growth and therefore in low unemployment, not high unemployment.  
Figures 15 and 16 portray a completely different process, with wide-ranging im-
plications. Here, the driving force of capitalism is not economic growth and the ac-
cumulation of productive machines and structures, but the differential accumulation 
of capitalized power. Now, understood as a power process, differential accumulation 
requires strategic sabotage, and this sabotage can take different forms. We have ex-
plored many of these forms in our previous works, and there are now young re-
searchers who are extending this inquiry into new fields and regions.6 But as the 
charts vividly illustrate, of these many processes of sabotage, the threat and exercise 
of unemployment remains central and crucial – not only temporarily as Marx sug-
gested, but permanently.  
This claim has significant implications for economic policy. As it turns out, the 
problem of policymakers is not only that their dogma has collapsed and that their 
ammunition has run out, but also, and more importantly, that their very policy goal 
is self-contradictory. Capitalist policy is geared, first and foremost, toward accumula-
tion. If accumulation recovers, argue both Marxists and liberals, economic growth 
will recover in tandem, and the tide of growth will then help lift up all boats – includ-
ing those of workers – by lowering unemployment and raising the real wage.  
However, if we think of capital as power, there is no way for policymakers to 
achieve both goals simultaneously, and for a simple reason: capitalists cannot afford 
recovery. In order for policymakers to boost the capitalist share of income, they need 
not to lower unemployment, but to raise it.   
With these thoughts in mind, the final question to ask is what lies ahead? If the 
relationship depicted in Figure 15 continues to hold, the share of capitalists in U.S. 
domestic income is set to rise further in the coming years. The crisis has raised un-
employment to its highest level since the 1930s, and this increase in strategic sabo-
tage should boost the power of capital and therefore its distributive share of income. 
But capitalists are never content with the status quo. Their regime compels them to 
augment their capitalized power further and further, and that means more strategic 
                                                          
6 See, for example, the edited volume of Tim Di Muzio (2013) on the capitalist mode of 
power. Other works include Syed Ozair Ali (2011) on stagflation in Pakistan, Joseph Baines 
(2013) on food profit and malnourishment, Jordan Brennan (2012) on dominant capital and 
income inequality in Canada, D.T. Cochrane and Jeff Monghan (2013) on differential 
accumulation and struggles in South Africa’s Apartheid, Tim Dimuzio (2011) on the 
ecological limits of differential accumulation, Sandy Brian Hager (2013b; 2013a) on the 
centralization of public debt ownership, Joseph Francis (2013 forthcoming) on regimes of 
differential accumulation in the United States and United Kingdom, Suhail Malik and Phillips 
Andrea (2012) on the art business, James McMahon (2013) on Hollywood’s risk reduction 
through standardization and Hyeng-Joon Park (2013b; 2013a) on differential accumulation in 
the development of modern South Korea. 
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sabotage and therefore even greater unemployment. And it is this need for ever 
greater sabotage – and the risk of backlash that record levels of sabotage may trigger 
– that fuels the systemic fear of both capitalists and their policymakers.  
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